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The year 2015 marked the centenary of the Armenian Genocide, the destruction of the 
Ottoman Armenians by the Ottoman state. 2015 saw unprecedented focus on the tragedy, its 
legacies, and wider reflections about the complexities of historical memory and nationalist 
state projects. The Genocide did not end in itself - it was followed by a denialist project that 
continues to challenge and undermine the memories of the survivors and the claims of their 
descendants, both from the remnant communities in Turkey, and the multi-layered, widely 
dispersed Armenian diaspora. This denial, “the final stage of genocide” (Stanton 1996), both 
a foundation of the Turkish state and a cornerstone of its policy, extends to ever-more 
creative
2
 and expansive international campaigns and efforts. 
 
The centenary year of the Genocide witnessed an escalation in cultural production and both 
political and academic focus. This paper looks at some of the sites and spaces, physical and 
discursive, in which the centenary was marked. In particular it seeks to assess how the 
centenary has challenged and possibly altered the context within which we approach the 
genocide and its continuing legacies. The paper is positioned in the diasporic space - while 





 and “host states” where diaspora communities have resided 
(at least) since the genocide, in effect their homes. The focus of the paper is the post-
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Genocide diaspora, distinct from the more recently formed post-Soviet Diaspora. This article 
attempts to pick out some of the themes apparent in the discourse and in the activities of the 
last year, from the perspective of Armenian diaspora actors, and is based on the author’s 
observations and participation in centenary events in the US, Lebanon, Turkey, Switzerland 
and the UK, as well as interviews with participants and organisers.  
 
Between History and Memory  
Historians have pondered the recent “Memory boom” (Winter 2000) and “the age of 
commemoration” as famously espoused by the ground-breaking work of Pierre Nora, as a 
challenge to the authority of the historian in mediating and presenting the past. The memory 
turn since the 1980s is at least in part a response to the loss of reverence for History and 
instead a realisation that it is important to engage with histories, narratives and experiences to 
get a complete picture of the range and complexities of human experience. This turn was 
facilitated by the rise in the Academy of gender studies, postcolonial theory, postmodernism, 
identity politics, and the emancipatory epistemological projects influenced by the work of 
Foucault and Edward Said that exposed power structures in the construction of knowledge. In 
this way Memory emerged as a counter-narrative to History. Centralising the human 
experience, Memory is focussed on biography, oral history, psychoanalysis, giving voice to 
the silenced and marginalised, and is a challenge to the linear historic national narrative. Sites 
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of Memory are particularly important in undermining nationalist and oppressive state 
narratives, and victors’ monolithic version of History - and creating a space for counter-
knowledge. In Turkey, the nationalist version of history and the state’s denial of the 
Armenian Genocide has been challenged and dismantled by a growing civil society 
movement and widening memory project centring around “coming to terms with the past” 
(geçmisle hesaplasma or geçmisle yüzleşme) since the 2000s, which Diygu Gül Kaya (2015) 
deconstructs as “rewriting History through a therapeutic public discourse.” Aybak (2016: 
129) analyses this binary in the Turkish context, saying, “…while history is expressed 
through written texts …. memory lives through places and cultural symbols that evoke 
painful memories of the survivors. Memory is evoked by historical and emotional 
experiences within specific geopolitical settings and acts as the device of collective 
commemorations.”   
 
Commemoration by the state is a lively discussion subject in the arena of national identity. In 
the French Republican model for example, state-led commemorations of the Holocaust, the 
slave trade and the Armenian genocide are sometimes viewed with suspicion as “desperate 
attempt to gain votes, often at the cost of sacrificing Republican values” (Van de Mieroop 
2016: 184). Whereas the assimilationist model like France sees these “community” interest 
commemorations as divisive and a threat to national unity, the multicultural models (E.g. of 
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the US and the UK, however discredited) view identity politics as an inclusive way of 
recognising and validating all constituencies of the populace, particularly minorities. Whereas 
some historians and politicians remain uncomfortable with the role of memorial politics, 
seeing it as fragmentary and retrospective, memory and commemoration can act as necessary 
vibrant and humane counter-sites to the disciplinary power of the state and its master-
narratives in contemporary societies.  Nora is somewhat troubled by the commemorative turn, 
saying that “the memorial model has triumphed over the historical model and ushered in a 
new, unpredictable and capricious use of the past… of moments of history torn away from 
the movement of history, then returned” (Nora 1989:12). Kistner considers this a shift from 
the “historical consciousness of the nation to a social consciousness” (Kistner 2010: 620), a 
crucial shift when one considers decolonising movements that seek to unearth the knowledge-
power nexus, like Rhodes Must Fall
5
 or Why is My Curriculum White?
6
 Kistner (2010: 630) 
also considers the democratising aspect of the memory turn, allowing for a range of actors, 
stakeholders and leaders: “the discourses of commemoration, officially disseminated through 
the advocacy of educationists, journalists, broadcasters, diplomats, heritage consultants, 
national and international policy makers and philanthropists, strip the historian of his/her 
relative monopoly status in representing and interpreting the past.”  
 
 6 
History, as espoused by the Turkish state, is a denialist one, which negates and silences the 
many Others in the story of the founding of the Republic from the Ottoman ashes. The 
silences are loudest when it comes to the Armenian genocide (and also, by extension, the 
genocide of Greeks, Assyrians, and other Christians of Anatolia).
7
 This is a History that 
contradicts and erases the Ottoman state’s own records, archives, testimonies8 and an 
abundance of documentation and proof, rendering it a History that is simply a tool for the 
hegemonic state to reproduce itself through generations. This History has been challenged by 
the work of a rising number of academics, intellectuals and artists of Turkey in recent years. 
In this way we have seen cracks in “the concrete wall of denial,”9 at least since the 2005 
conference at Bilgi University on “Ottoman Armenians during the decline of the Empire,” 
which also ushered in a period of discussion of the Armenian genocide in Turkey in the 
public sphere. That this is a complex and contentious terrain is clear, not least because of the 
layers of power and authority, reach and impact, contained within this discursive space. For 
example, Ayda Erbal (2015: 783-785) is not only critical of the “ever-adjusting dynamic of 
denial” role played by the intellectuals of Turkey’s “old establishment” but also makes the 
damning claim that civil society actors involved in “building the discourse on the Armenian 
Genocide”10 have actually established “more sophisticated discourses of genocide denial.” 
Regardless of the sincerity or integrity of civil society actors and intellectuals in Turkey, and 
their complex negotiations with the state, it is now evident that any apparent “softening” has 
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come to an end, any “cracks” crudely plastered over by the state as it reasserts itself and its 
narrative, since 2015 squeezing further the space for dissent and difference, and punishing 
those that dare to challenge it. 
 
Nonetheless, Memory, however suppressed and silenced, is alive in Turkey, and acts as a 
counter-narrative to (denialist) history. It is present in three broad inter-related domains. In 
the case of the remnant Armenian community in Istanbul, the denial of their history and 
therefore their identity is a form of continuous personal and existential violence. Irvin-
Ericson, La Pointe and Laban Hinton (2013:9) in their say: “When genocide is denied, the 
dehumanizing mechanisms in place during the actual genocide are transferred   forward in 
history, ensuring that the genocide continues into perpetuity, long after the physical killing 
has been done.” In the past few years there has been an academic focus on the Istanbul 
Armenian community that grapples with their highly complex position of being physical 
reminders/ remainders of a historic genocide that their state denies ever took place.
11
 Aside 
from the Istanbul Armenian community, another challenge to state History in the past ten 
years has been the rise of the phenomenon of the Islamised Armenians – descendants of 
Armenians who were “taken in” by Turks and Kurds, who were converted to Islam and in 
some cases have apparently lived covertly in knowledge of their difference. Fethiye Cetin”s 
ground-breaking memoir, Anneannem (2004) paved the way for both public interest and 
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scholarship in this topic in recent years, positioned within the shared histories projects to 
unearth the hidden human legacies of state violence and silences (Kasbarian and Öktem 2014 
and 2016). More broadly, state History in Turkey has been challenged by the memories (first 
hand or passed down through generations) of those who witnessed the genocide.
12
 Ugur Umit 
Ungor (2014) through extensive oral history research
13
 in Anatolia concludes that “the 
Turkish government is denying a genocide that its own population remembers.” Building on 
Aleida Assman’s (2010) three categories of collective memory – social, cultural and political, 
Ungor (2014: 149) masterfully demonstrates that “the Turkish handling of the memory of the 
Armenian genocide is characterised by a successful silencing of high-culture and written 
texts, but a failure of silencing the social and cultural memory of the perpetrator, bystander 
and victim communities.”  
 
In the Armenian case, Memory of the Genocide has been an essential component of diasporic 
identity. Generations have grown up with their parents, grandparents and great-grandparents’ 
personal accounts of loss, displacement and of starting over - the memory of the genocide 
transmitted intergenerationally.
14
 These memories are the human stories that accompany 
Armenian modern History, illustrating the mainstream historical narrative with personal 
experiences and stories from the past. Furthermore, the narrative of the genocide acts as a 
“fund of knowledge because of how central this story’s transmission has been for this 
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particular community” (Azarian-Ceccato 2010: 121). Thus the Armenian diasporic collective 
memory is one that annotates Armenian history and Armenian diasporic identity. The local, 
micro, family stories anchor the historical narrative. There is a rich trove of Armenian 
personal accounts and oral histories
15
 that act as a complement to the wide range of historical 
evidence – from eyewitness accounts to archival records16 which have informed the 
mainstream historiography of the Armenian genocide in the ensuing decades. Thus there is no 
gap between History and Memory in the Armenian case – they are intertwined.  
 
In the past two decades in particular, with the third generation of post-genocide descendants 
at the helm, and the means and mechanisms of globalisation revolutionising activism, 
Armenian diasporic efforts have been concentrated on influencing at the level of high 
politics. These have focussed on education, raising awareness, combating denialism, political 
lobbying and working towards the official recognition of the genocide in their various home 
states. This political emphasis has arguably hindered the potential for multi-layered 
commemoration by communities, with personal and collective memor(ies) being more 
confined to the realms of the arts, the spiritual/ religious and the more intimate/ personal. The 
centenary was arguably a watershed moment that represented a culmination in the boon in 
cultural production, alongside an overwhelming validation of the genocide in scholarship. 
This paper makes the claim that the energy and synergy around these proliferating projects 
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and initiatives during the centenary year reinforced a merging of History and Memory that 
resulted in a subtle but profound shift in the representation and understanding of the 
Armenian genocide in the transnational public sphere. 
 
Normalisation and Neo-Denialism 
Alongside a heightening of the annual commemorations at the community level, the 
centenary of the genocide was marked by a wide range of international and national events. 
These included high profile events led by the Republic of Armenia (E.g. a Global Forum 
against genocide in Yerevan on 22-23 April 2015 featuring prominent genocide scholars)
17
 
and by individual diasporans (E.g. 100 Lives),
18
 a proliferation of academic conferences, 
publications, as well as lobbying and advocacy initiatives,
19
 alongside unprecedented media 
focus.  It is important to note that the commemorative activities were two-pronged in scope 
and outreach. On the one hand, they addressed international audiences; on the other, they 
were for internal consumption, i.e. a validating experience for the Armenian transnation,
20
 
whether at the level of the local, national or international.   
 
The sheer volume of activities validating the Genocide would suggest that the centenary 
ushered in a new era of normalisation, conclusively shedding all vestiges of “controversy” in 
the public sphere. While this is true, it is only part of the picture. Alongside the normalisation 
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process, there is clearly evident also, a renewed mobilisation in the denialism project - from 
the Turkish state, its subsidiaries and supporters throughout the world. That these two 
opposing forces – normalisation and neo-denialism - co-exist is not remarkable: as social 
scientists we are familiar with the presence of opposing trends, sometimes creating and 
mirroring each other, sometimes mutually exclusive and preaching to clearly demarcated 
constituencies. Occasionally these worlds clash in unexpected ways and in unlikely spaces. 
One example of this is the response on social media to Aleen Keshishian, a well-known 
Hollywood celebrity manager, when she posted a picture of an April 24 memorial march in 
Los Angeles. The degree of venom unleashed on Instagram (over 14,000 responses in 
Turkish and English), was all the more worrying as the majority of comments were from pre-




Genocide denial has never been a majority position or a stronghold in the academy (Smith 
2015; Mamigonian 2015) and serious historical research and historians (outside Turkey) have 
always validated the Armenian genocide.
22
 However, the multi-thronged denialism of the 
Turkish state particularly since the 1970s has had some success in attaching a certain question 
mark over the genocide in the international public sphere.
23
 The major impact of this on the 
Armenian diaspora, and a perverse characteristic that has subsequently marked it, is the 
obsessive pursuit of “the dream of finally and fully establishing the fact of their own death” 
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(Kazanjian 2011: 371). More broadly, as Theriault (2009), drawing from Charny (1992), has 
eloquently articulated, the denialist campaign has meant that the genocide itself has become a 
secondary concern - the need to combat denialism and prove genocide the “all-encompassing 
focus,” when in fact it is a “contrived focus, a diversion” from engaging with the effects of 
the genocide. This has undoubtedly influenced the nature and form of diaspora activism over 
the decades, responding, and therefore falling victim to the framework set by the denialism of 
the Turkish state. Thierault (2009:94) explains this: “… the effort of struggling against an 
extensive, well-funded, state-sponsored denial campaign is a tremendous drain on the victim 
community, combining resource depletion with the emotional costs of facing denigration and 
injustice through denial on a continuing basis.”  Arguably therefore, Armenian diasporan 
activism, particularly with regard to international genocide recognition, has been a response 
to the denialist script propagated by the Turkish state, and has meant that the diaspora has 
been pre-occupied with the unedifying perceived need to “prove” their collective deaths to 
the world at large (Nichanian 2009). 
 
The normalisation of the genocide as the telos of the critical mass of scholarship and cultural 
production that takes the genocide as a fact, offers the Armenian diaspora a fresh future 
trajectory. The normalisation signifies a shift from (so-called) “genocide” to Genocide. 
Genocide denial has been rendered untenable by rigorous documentation - respected 
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international scholarship in the past two decades has overwhelmingly validated the Armenian 
Genocide, and opened up new areas of exciting research. The evolution of this intellectual 
terrain is mapped out in detailed analysis by several of the texts that were published since 
2014, including the widely acclaimed books by Ronald Grigor Suny (2015) and Fatma Müge 
Göçek (2014). As discussed by Kasbarian and Öktem (2016), instead of two opposing sides 
caught in an impasse, the scholarship today reflects theoretically-informed and nuanced 
positions, set within inclusive and dynamic intellectual frameworks, and marks a turning 
point in the study of the Armenian Genocide. 
 
Nonetheless, the Turkish state continues its denialist policies, albeit in more subtle and 
refined ways.
24
 Termed “denial light” (Goshgarian 2014), i.e. more nuanced forms of denial, 
this is evident in the “common pain” thesis in President Erdogan’s “apology” of 2014 which 
“removes the agency from the act of killing by pretending that the cause of deaths and 
sufferings was the natural outcome of a great catastrophe: the instigation of the Ottoman 
Empire” (Aybak 2016: 134). As Kasbarian and Öktem (2016: 93) have examined, the “more 
refined” state discourse became a “denialism based on relativization and deflection,..on the 
insistence of “shared suffering” while failing to accept significant power asymmetries.. the 
result (being) the denial of responsibility, and the circumvention, or rather effacement, of the 
crime.” Erdogan’s “common pain” statement is in fact a logical continuation and a clever 
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employment of the anti-History commemorative approach. If the past is merely a matter of 
perspective, then all memories and narratives are (equally) valid and all commemorations on 
the same moral ground. In this respect, Memory as a counter-narrative to History is open to 
misuse as it can relativize history. The “memory turn” can be exploited and manipulated by 
the “oppressors” as well as the “oppressed,” the perpetrators as well as the victims, the strong 
as well as the weak – it can be a tool to spread lies rather than uncover the truth. That is why, 
as discussed in the earlier section, Memory needs to be underpinned by History based on 
scrupulous scholarship, as in the case of the Armenian genocide. Sometimes this approach is 
far from subtle - the Turkish government’s decision to move the Gallipoli commemoration to 
24 April in the year of the centenary was not just a blatant attempt to undermine the genocide 
centenary but also an attempt to “reframe history” (Aybak 2016: 136) and a “deliberate act of 
rebranding the denialist strategy.”  
 
At the same time, tried and tested strategies of denial are thriving. At the Global Forum 
against genocide in Yerevan on 22-23 April 2015 scholars discussed comparative cases. 
Perpetrating regimes in Rwanda, Cambodia and so on, can draw on the example of the 
Turkish state in the international arena and at home, with policies designed to “create doubt, 
among a public  that has little or no information to begin with… The goal is to create the 
notion that there are two sides   to the “controversy” and that there should be an open debate 
 15 
between both sides.” (Smith 2016: 104) Aside from the structural power disparity between 
the reductive “two sides” framework, this approach again promotes that the idea that the past 
is merely a question of perspective. This objective is to obfuscate, thereby belittling and 
casting aspersions on any challenge to the master narrative. A fuzzy position rather than a 
principled one is then adopted by misguided third parties in a misinformed desire not to seem 
“biased.” 
 
Denial is also persistent in diluted or subterfuge forms in the public sphere. Sometimes it is 
not necessarily denial as such but indifference or ignorance, which has the same effect 
regardless. The review of Ronald G. Suny’s book They can Live in the Desert but Nowhere 
else: A History of the Armenian Genocide (Princeton University Press, 2015), in the leading 
British periodical, the London Review of Books
25
 (LRB, 4 June 2015) for example, drew 
criticism for its almost complete lack of engagement with the text, and its side-lining of the 
issues discussed.
26
 Instead, the reviewer, Edward Luttwak mentioned a list of denialist 
scholars who support what appeared to be an unsubstantiated claim that what happened to the 
Armenians was not a genocide because the Ottoman authorities “were not fully 
exterminationist”, and that forced conversions and deportations (alongside widespread 
murder) somehow mitigate exterminationist intent. A complaint letter that this author wrote 
and co-ordinated (signed by nine well-known UK and European academics active in this 
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field) was met with a tepid response from the LRB saying that the piece had been 
inaccurately billed as a review, side- stepping the concerns we had raised.  The LRB did not 
publish the letter. 
 
From Victimhood to Agency 
Normalisation has been achieved by a number of distinct discursive and conceptual 
approaches evident in the wider discourse. There include: a global reframing of the genocide 
as an issue of historical justice along the lines of shared humanity; a comparative 
contextualisation, linking it to more recent genocides; its relevance and resonance for the 
present day situation (particularly in the Middle East); as part of an emancipatory and 
epistemological project to expose the nexus between truth, power and knowledge 
construction; as part of a moral preventative project to remember victims and  raise 
awareness about comparable contemporary situations. We see these overlapping positionings 
evident in much of the literature, discourse and analyses produced in the past year, by 
politicians, civil society actors and media alike.  
 
The speech of the Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan on the centenary was a masterful 
expounding of this reframing and  contextualisation, set in the wider context of the 
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importance of commemoration, not just for the past but of the sake of the present and future. 
As such, it is worth quoting some of the more salient points: 
Unfortunately, April left a black trace in the history of not only the Armenian people, but 
humankind as whole. April is also the month in which the perpetration of the Holocaust, and 
crimes of genocide in Rwanda and Cambodia commenced. We stand here today, in the very 
month of April, in Tsitsernakaberd — the Armenian Genocide Memorial, to proclaim: May 
there never again be a need to erect a memorial to commemorate new disgraceful chapters of 
history anywhere in the world! May there be no more need for a new Tsitsernakaberd, Yad 
Vashem, Killing Fields, and Gisozi!.... 
The goal of our policy, anchored in memory and responsibility, is to form effective 
mechanisms for preventing future crimes against humanity. As Pope Francis justly said, 
“concealing or denying evil is like allowing a wound to keep bleeding without bandaging it.” 
The wound is bleeding, because there is too much neutrality, silence, and denial around the 
world, and there is still too little humanity. 
We shall not forget that for centuries humanism and benevolence have been the engine that 
led the formation of international human rights mechanisms. Moral aspirations and universal 
values were what inspired Henry Dunant to lay the ground for creation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Moral values and the horrifying reality of the Armenian 
Genocide were what urged Raphael Lemkin to coin the term “genocide,” which would 
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unfortunately have to be used over and over again. As a matter of fact, when Lemkin was 
asked what genocide was, he answered that it was what happened to the Armenians. 
As we speak, there are still too many instances of denying universal values and contorting 
history, which pave the way to the recurrence of these crimes: we can all see the situation in 
the Middle East…. 
Around the world, conscience and probity are withstanding the cruel, but retreating machine 
of the Armenian Genocide denial. Conscience and probity are the antipodes of denial. 
Recognition of the Genocide is not the world’s tribute to the Armenian people and our 
martyrs. Recognition of the Genocide is the triumph of human conscience and justice over 
intolerance and hatred. 
The Armenian people will always remain standing by the side of those who suffered from 
crimes against humanity. The unyielding international struggle against crimes of genocide 
will remain an integral part of our foreign policy.” 27 
 
It is important to note is that the president of Armenia is a divisive figure both in the diaspora 
and at home. Since 2010 there has been the emergence of a new wave of civic activism in 
Armenia, supported by diaspora activists
28
 who accuse the government broadly of being 
undemocratic, corrupt, failing to uphold the law, pandering to oligarchs, and more widely 
failing to address the everyday needs of Armenian citizens.
29
 By presenting himself as the 
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voice of the Armenian people (past, present and future) the president employed genocide 
commemoration activities as a means of garnering (both international and domestic) 
legitimacy for himself and his regime. Thus we see genocide commemoration and 
recognition as a unifying tool employed by the state to dispel challenges and criticism both 
within and without.
30
 By aligning himself with international statesmen and spiritual leaders 
like the Pope, the President and his government were rehabilitated as the voice of the 
oppressed, the moral conscience of the world. It would appear that for a brief historical 
moment the president was able to transcend the realities of his government’s record under the 
unifying symbol of the genocide and its accompanying narrative.  
 
As the speech above alludes, the Pope’s intervention in the centenary debate was perhaps the 
most significant.  Pope Francis, as a respected and popular global leader garnered 
unparalleled international attention for his moral voice, the first Pope to speak with 
uncompromising authority and clarity on the Armenian genocide, a subject with which he has 
long been familiar. For worldwide Armenians (10% of whom are Catholic) the Pope’s stance 
was received with an almost incredulous and overwhelmed gratitude and seen as a huge boost 
to the Armenian cause.
31
 Predictably, the Pope’s statement was met with fury and retaliation 
by the Turkish state, which recalled its envoy to the Vatican, and claimed that the Pope had 
been brainwashed by the “rich and powerful” Armenian community in Argentina.32 One of 
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the central myths of the Turkish state is the existence of a huge, wealthy, united, powerful 
Armenian diaspora, seeking vengeance on Turkey (with no engagement as to why 
“vengeance” might even be sought). While there is clearly a mobilised and influential 
Armenians diaspora political lobby in Washington and to a lesser extent Europe, this image 
has taken on preposterous proportions, given the size of the Armenian communities, their 
heterogeneity and disparities within – and all the more ridiculous when viewed in relation to 
a strong (and strategically crucial NATO ally) regional power. And yet it is a constant refrain, 
and a central tenet of denialist propaganda and state narrative built on the tried and tested 
principle that a lie told often enough is believed, in a wider post-truth culture.  
 
The Pope’s message:33 “It is necessary, and indeed a duty, to honor their memory, for 
whenever memory fades, it means that evil allows wounds to fester. Concealing or denying 
evil is like allowing a wound to keep bleeding without bandaging it!”34 also shone a light on 
the states which recognised the genocide and the ones that did not – escalating the public 
debate about acknowledgement. Roger W. Smith (2016: 101) contextualises the significance 
of the Armenian genocide saying, “Denial of this genocide is the most extensive and 
prolonged denial of genocide by a state, aided and abetted by other governments out of 
expediency.” The concern is that denial gives the message to contemporary perpetrators in 
comparable cases that they can get away with it, as long as their state machinery is powerful 
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enough. In the case of the UN and other such international agents, the responsibility to 
remember genocides is about the present and future as well, to guard and protect the fragile 
peace. With the Holocaust as the central memory, the UN commemorative discourse 
collapses time by referring to past and present atrocities in the same breath, drawing a 
continuous line and comparative perspective between distinct cases like the Holocaust, 
Rwanda, Darfur. This has the aim and effect of narrating “this work of mourning as a 
globally inclusive venture” and “in the process, the exclusivity of a remembered past… to a 
particular state is diminished while its learning potential for wider audiences is emphasised.” 
(Skillington 2013: 508) 
 
Crucial to this reframing is a renewed engagement with the victims of genocide, and a desire 
to create a space where they can retrospectively “speak” or at least be “heard.” Marc 
Nichanian (2009) has written definitively about the problems associated with speaking on 
behalf of victims, silenced voices and those erased from history, and how this itself can be an 
act of violence. The question of whether the most subaltern of subalterns can speak - to 
paraphrase Gayatri Spivak’s famous question (1994) – is highly contentious and complex. 
Nonetheless, the shift towards memory studies, history from below and from the margins, and 
projects grounded in critical and feminist studies have indeed made such a forum possible.
35
 
As Jo Laycock (2015: 13) analyses, ethnographic and memory based studies have helped in 
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“reframing Armenians as individuals and historical actors rather than simply as 
undifferentiated passive victims.”  This is a crucial shift as it rebalances the tendency to 
reduce all Armenian experience to victimhood, and inextricably tied to the genocide.  
 
Within this space that is being shaped, there are inevitably residual and new complexities 
concerning power, agency and representation. One issue is that the space is often situated 
under the umbrella of Turkey “coming to terms with the past,” and as such the Armenian 
genocide is just one theme among many, thereby running a risk of being diluted, reduced or 
sidelined. While Armenian diasporan academics are certainly supportive of democratising 
movements within the liberal Turkish transnational civil sphere, there was also uneasiness 
expressed by some. This centred on the question of who is setting the agenda and framing the 
issues. Some are troubled by what they see as Turkish/ Kurdish narratives dominating the 
stage,
36
 with Armenian voices hardly present – (unintentionally) replicating the historic 
binary and power structure,
37
 as well as reflecting the historically subaltern position that 
Armenians hold in modern Turkey. Many of my interviewees were also uncomfortable about 
their inclusion in programmes as a “token Armenian” voice in a staged and pre-determined 
narrative. Some were more explicit about what they interpreted as an instrumental takeover of 
the genocide discussion by the Turkish/ Kurdish liberal sphere, with Armenian perspectives 
being crowded out.
38
 Others have also identified and exposed this undercurrent, on display 
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perhaps most clearly in the intellectual and academic space. Ayda Erbal (2015: 785) has 
criticised Turkish civil society actors in this field for among other things, “denying or 
ignoring the power asymmetry between themselves and their interlocutors both in Turkey and 
the diasporas” and for “behaving in total majority entitlement as owners of the playfield.” 
Burcu Gursel (2015: 793) talking about the decade since 2005 says, “Records on live 
encounters… between Turkish and Armenian intellectuals, whether from Turkey or outside, 
testify to the assumption on the part of Turkish intellectuals that they will continue to dictate 
the terms, timing, and style of debate…” This feeling was shared by several Armenian 
diasporans in my interviews, uncomfortable with what they interpret is the setting of the 
parameters, the staging of the interaction, and the controlling of the ensuing narrative by 
Turks or Kurds. Several even said they had turned down invitations to participate in 
centenary panel discussions and other events due to feeling instrumentalised and sidelined.   
 
It would seem that the broadened engagement with the genocide as part of a wider 
intellectual endeavour by a wide range of actors runs the risk of reducing the subject to one of 
academic industry, and marginalising (or indeed ignoring) the experiences of both the victims 
and their descendants – who are mostly absent from the discussion. Situating the genocide 
discussion in the sphere and under the control of a Turkish/ Kurdish intellectual project can 
deprive it of its own voice and agency. In effect therefore, the Armenian experience risks 
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being defined by the Turkish experience (again).  This is a painful and highly charged 
subject, which cannot yet be discussed openly for fear of undoing years of good work, good 
will and solidarity on post-nationalist grounds. It also challenges Armenians to be aware of 
their internalisation of a subaltern consciousness. Nonetheless, it would seem that the 
centenary brought about or exposed a new dynamic, and the need for ever cautious and 
sensitive attention and stocktaking by those who are constructing the political projects and 
the discourse on the ground. Although there are overlapping sites and spaces within which 
the genocide is engaged with, the need for vigilance regarding power and agency is constant.   
 
When analysing the media coverage of the centenary year we also see an emphasis on the 
personal. This is primarily through an approach of using personal memories and life stories to 
graft on to a wider narrative. The approach of humanising the political in order to make it 
accessible has become embedded in the popular media. For example, in the UK we saw the 
initiative from the broadsheet Guardian that focussed on documenting the Lives of 
survivors
39
 and their descendants as a means of writing forthright political pieces. At the 
other end of the political spectrum, the tabloid Daily Mail ran huge features on the 
Kardashians’ family story,40 as well as extensive coverage of their visit to Armenia in early 
April.
41
 Much has been made of the Kardashian visit to Armenia and their commitment to the 
memory of the genocide and its recognition, but whatever we might think of the clan, as the 
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most (in)famous Armenians in the world they have a huge impact. At the very least, the 
Kardashians, due to their huge popular fanbase, drew the attention of millions who were 




The trope of drawing from personal stories, memoirs and oral history has always been 
popular in the Armenian literature scene, and has proliferated in other languages since the 
1980s, with the publication of many biographies, novels, and other art forms, based on family 
epics spanning the past 100 years. This approach has taken on a new urgency as genocide 
survivors are almost all passed on, though their testimonies remain. With rare exceptions the 
memoirs of survivors were translated into other languages decades after the genocide, and in 
most cases left the grandchildren’s’ generation to publish for a wider audience. This more 
recent literary genre of either biographical works, or drawing from biographies as inspiration 
for novels and other literary forms, reached wider audiences as works were ether written or 
translated into English. Notable recent publications that draw from archives and personal 
stories passed down through the generations
43
 include Peter Balakian’s Black Dog of Fate, 
Fethiye Çetin’s Anneannem, certain novels of Elif Shafak and Chris Bohjalian among others, 
as well as a new edition of the seminal The 40 days of Musa Dagh by Franz Werfel.
44
  This 
popular genre overlaps with the academic emphasis on humanising/ personifying the 
political, thereby appealing to a common humanity. 
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Contextualising Communities - Sites and Tropes of Memory and Commemoration  
How we remember and construct the past is also very much about the present, and reflects 
current struggles and preoccupations. In 2014 much of the world was already in a spirit of 
commemoration, with the centennial of the First World War.
45
 This included a new creative 
focus on the Middle East experience of the war.
46
 How states, nations and communities 
reflect upon the one hundred year old Armenian Genocide mirrors their own situated political 
realities. These are rarely unified voices – the various agents of commemoration are 
inevitably polyphonic in their interpretative and mediatory roles, reflective of their wider 
community and national context. 
 
For diasporan actors, remembering the dead and bearing witness to the tragedy that befell 
them, is intrinsically also about the diaspora which has its birthing moment in this Genocide. 
The genocide is the defining characteristic of the communities who are stakeholders in its 
memorialisation. So the centenary was potentially an opportunity not just to reflect on the 
past, but to articulate the present and also to envision a future, as communities and as a 
transnation. It was an opportunity to move from victim to actor, from the subaltern to the 
agent, as reflected upon by one of my interviewees: 
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“The genocide has always been part of my life. I was fortunate in being brought up by two 
grandmothers who were survivors and the genocide was always present….It is only the 
generation after mine that is growing with an increasing sense of rootedness. The genocide is 
ever present in my life, every day. The 100
th
 anniversary is a landmark I guess, a point to stop 
and take stock, to see how far we have come in 100 years and how much more needs to be 
done to get closure, achieve a fair treatment of a historical subject. It is only now that a 
critical historiography is emerging and is at last being taken seriously. It is also a point to 
think about my grandparents” experiences, my parents who are the generation who had no 
childhood – the generation that built and rebuilt, and to think about my generation too, the 
fortunate one.” 
Diasporan Academic, London, October 2015 interview 
 
The commemorations grounded the Genocide as the point of origin for citizens of Armenian 
origin in their home countries, making it more visible and part of the national story, whether 
recognised officially by their government or not. At my own university for example one (now 
former) student launched an online campaign for the UK to recognise the genocide
47
 - a 
social media campaign that proved effective in terms of awareness raising among British 
university students.  A programme of centenary events took place in every Armenian 
community, both instigated and led by the traditional leaders like the churches; the Armenian 
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embassies; the various quasi-political groups; but also by a multitude of other groups and 
individual initiatives.
48
 This level of energy expounded on the anniversary was unprecedented 
and it would be true to say, somewhat unexpected. Many of these activities adopted the 
approaches and modes outlined in the previous section, particularly the reframing of the 
genocide in a wider, comparative context.  
 
Despite widespread emigration, Lebanon remains home to a significant Armenian 
community,
49
 and Armenians of all three Christian traditions are officially recognised and 
included in the Lebanese sectarian state system. Some of them still live in Burj Hamoud, 
where the refugee camps remained almost unchanged for decades, often referred to as 
“Lebanon’s Little Armenia.” Lebanon remains a beloved home in the Armenian diasporic 
imagination, a place where Armenians were able to find sanctuary, regroup and rebuild post-
genocide (Migliorino 2008), and maintains a special status in the transnation. Here the 
genocide centenary was contextualised as part of the wider catastrophe of the Great Famine 
of 1915-18 when half the 400,000 population of Mount Lebanon were wiped out,
50
 weaving 
together the national Lebanese narrative with the Armenian experience. This trope of grafting 
a national/ community story onto the wider national/state narrative was apparent throughout 
the centenary and a useful approach inviting wider comparison and empathy.
51
 Stories of 
tragedy, when recounted by the victims or their descendants are potentially stories of 
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resistance and resilience. Lebanon is also home to the most famous resistance movement, the 
Musa Dagh Armenians,
52
 who are today the inhabitants of Anjar, in the Bekaa Valley. 
Incidentally, April 24 is the one event that all the different and divided actors in the Lebanese 
Armenian community unite for,
53
 reflecting again the sacred nature of the genocide for the 
Armenian transnation. 
 
Lebanon’s memorialisation of the Great Famine of 1915-18 through art, culture and media54 
extended to public interest in the stories of the arrival of the Armenian genocide survivors. 
2015 marked a distinct effort to universalise the Armenian tragedy in Lebanon – drawing on 
the commonalties with the wider Lebanese experience, of the death from starvation and 
disease of at least a third of the population, during the First World War. This resulted in the 
genocide being interpreted and presented with a new confidence as a Lebanese and an Arab 
issue. Armenian Lebanese MP Hagop Pakradounian in his speech on the day said, “Arab 
people have lived under oppression and injustice… Four centuries of occupation and the 
filling of Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq… make the cause of the 
genocide an Arab-Armenian one.”55 His sentiments were echoed by politicians across the 
board in solidarity with Armenians.  
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April 24th was declared a public holiday in the country for the first time in 2015, and most 
political parties and religious leaders spoke out in support of its wider acknowledgement. 
However this was not universally the case. Some Sunni groups were vocal in their 
condemnation of this move, and also in their views that it was not genocide but that in fact 
the Armenians were themselves perpetrators of genocide. They retaliated against the 
government’s decision to close schools for the day denouncing it as a tactical move to curry 
favour with the Armenian populace. This resulted in demonstrations, mostly in Sidon and 
Tripoli,
56
 where Turkish flags were raised over schools and buildings. Al-Jamaa al-Islamiya 
swathed its mosques with Turkish flags and pictures of the Turkish President.  This turn of 
events has continued in 2016, and extends to the world of social media where people can be 
even more outspoken in their support for the perpetrators, even calling for a repeat massacre 
– “this time in Burj Hamoud”(Tashjian 2016B). This is one example of how the Armenian 
genocide is used as a political tool in the contested sectarian narratives of Lebanon. The 
commemoration of the centenary in Lebanon reflected the realities of the Armenian 
community there, their apparent security and longevity, alongside an underlying 
precariousness that can erupt at any moment. The commemorations and discourse were 
reflective of the highly politicised sectarian nature of the state and society in Lebanon, which 
extends to its Armenian constituents. 
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New Spaces and Old Sites  
A crucial aspect of genocide commemoration is the possibility of plotting a different future 
trajectory. In the past decade we have seen the carving out of a new and radical space led by 
Turkish and Armenian activists situated in transnational civil society, constructing new 
avenues and identities. Joint commemoration events in 2015 revealed the space that has been 
painstakingly prised open and needs to be protected and defended (Kasbarian and Öktem 
2014). In this alternative site, it is possible for nationalist binaries to be transgressed, for 
Armenians, Turks, Kurds and others to stand together, and to mourn together. 
 
Intrinsic to these safe spaces and circles of trust, lies also the possibility of a real encounter 
with Turkey for diasporan Armenians, whether in short trips to see ancestral lands, to work 
with the civil society organisations that have sprung up relating to these issues or to 
contribute to projects to restore Armenian churches like Surp (Saint) Giragos, the sixteenth-
century Armenian Apostolic Cathedral in Diyarbakır, the biggest Armenian church in the 
Middle East, which has lain in ruin for decades.
57
 Anny Bakalian and Zeynap Turan (2015) 
have written poignantly about a kind of modern day pilgrimage to Turkey through organised 
bespoke tours - and what a transformative experience this is for the participants. This 
encounter with ancestral lands is both a memory site but also a real living place whose 
inhabitants offer meaningful and challenging encounters. 
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The burgeoning trend among small sections of the diaspora to visit Turkey extended to the 
small numbers of Armenian diasporans, individuals or organised new groups like Project 
2015
58
 or led by diaspora institutions like the Armenian General Benevolent Union,
59
 who 
chose to spend April 24
th
 2015 in Turkey. They joined local Armenian activists like Nor 
Zartonk (New Renaissance),
60
 a social movement that highlights the plight of Armenians in 
Turkey, amidst a wider platform of human rights and social justice issues.
61
  Commemorating 
in the face of state denial is a political act and an act of defiance, most poignantly 
experienced in that week in Turkey, when Armenians, Turks, Kurds and others came together 
in solidarity to remember, but also to symbolise a different present and a future, poignantly 
articulated by Heghnar Watenpaugh (2015) at Taksim Square at the ceremony:  
 
“We are here today with Armenians from around the world and citizens of many nationalities 
who have travelled to stand against denial. We are here today with citizens of Turkey who 
are standing with us in our quest for redress and restitution. 
I am here today with my children….because I want them to embrace the land of their 
ancestors. I want for them a world in which we can stand together with dignity, equality, and 
justice for all the people of this land, and for all people around the world. 
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Friends, let’s begin again, and like my great-grandmother, let’s climb our mountain together. 
Let us hear the bells ringing, urging us on. Let us work together for justice.” 
 
The act of standing in the centre of Istanbul, where Armenian intellectuals and leaders were 
rounded up one hundred year ago, was a powerful experience. Its meaningful nature was 
twofold – the embodiment of physical resistance and survival, and solidarity with a host of 
others. That the nature of this experience was symbolic resistance rather than a direct 
challenge or any change to the nationalist state narrative does not detract from its 
significance. In a polarized world of “resistance” to leaders and policies which are anathema 
to half their electorates, the act of protest and the claiming of physical and verbal space has 
taken on new urgency. This power of simply being present, was the focus of my interviewees 
who took part in these events, vividly conveyed in these two extracts: 
 
“We are alive -- the genocide did not finish us. We were able to stand in the heart of Istanbul, 
at Taksim Square, and demand recognition of the Genocide by Turkey… Even as we pay 
tribute to the victims and honour their lives, and continue to demand justice and recognition, 
the centenary for us was not a “dark event”, but a reaffirmation of life.” 
Diasporan leader, London, Email interview, October 2015 
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“Seeing Armenians, Turks, Kurds, Greeks, all together, marking the event with respect and 
solemnity and especially solidarity is an experience I will never forget. Hearing and then 
seeing the thousands of marching HDP supporters led by Nor Zartonk was an especially 
powerful moment for me – seeing young, educated Turkish Armenians and their supporters 
carrying banners “Menk Hos Enk” meant everything. I picked a discarded Nor Zartonk 
banner with these words and it is hanging in a frame in my office. Perhaps there is hope.” 
Diasporan Scholar, London, Email interview, October 2015 
 
This moment of solidarity is more poignant still given the deteriorating political and human 
rights situation in Turkey since. Many of the same Turkish and Kurdish activists and 
academics situated in this new and precarious space, have been intimidated, threatened, 
dismissed from their jobs, and jailed as “terrorists” following their criticism of the 
government’s violence against the Kurds.62 The failed coup against the government in July 
2016 led to subsequent waves of purges of state employees, many from the education sector. 
What we are witnessing is the narrowing of any space for dissent in the Turkish public 
sphere, and a government that has repeatedly shown its lack of hesitation to crush any 
opposition. The climate since the centenary commemorations of April 2015 is one of 
escalating fear and insecurity – it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the centenary 
programme would be difficult to envisage in the present environment in Turkey. 
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In 2015, diaspora communities throughout the world put on unprecedented scale and series of 
events to commemorate and to call for recognition of the genocide.
63
 In Los Angeles, home 
to a significant Armenian population, 100,000 people took part in a six mile march to the 
Turkish embassy.
64
 In Europe the lights were switched off at the Eiffel tower and the 
Coliseum in memory of the victims. Alongside organising an extensive array of cultural, 
political and social events in their home communities, significant numbers of diasporans 
made the journey to Armenia for the impressive commemorations programme.
65
 It would be 
accurate to say that the Armenian Republic took on the leading international role in the 
genocide commemorations, both setting and influencing the agenda. This was sometimes 
resented by diaspora communities
66
 who saw the genocide as being more “their” issue than 
the Armenian state’s, given that it is their birthing moment and arguably, their defining 
experience. Yerevan was the site of a wide range of commemorative activity and articulation, 
led by leaders and influencers across a very broad church - from celebrities to human rights 
activists to world leaders. This eclectic and creative mix of actors and initiatives also 
demonstrated in full glory the multi-faceted Armenian diaspora.  Among the musical events 
alone, were an impromptu concert by Kanye West (husband of Kim Kardashian), concerts by 
French Armenian legend Charles Aznavour and the Armenian American rock band System of 
a Down. The latter are well-known for their political activism, and played a powerful set that 
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seemed to embody the tensions and struggles of Armenians, past and present, that one 
interviewee summed up lyrically:  
 
“For a moment at least all the contradictions between an angry hard rock band of 
diasporans raised in Los Angeles and a weary post-Soviet republic dissolved. It was a night 
that the youngsters on the square will remember for the rest of their lives, a night when all 
the endless fractures and contradictions of being Armenian today were eclipsed. As so much 
of the best rock music is, this was rock as political activism, and anyone who had doubted the 
appropriateness of a rock concert on the eve of a genocide centenary saw their doubts 
similarly eclipsed. As if someone had really wanted to rain on the Armenian party, the 
driving rain that had only intensified as the concert went on, suddenly ceased shortly after 
SOAD left the stage. They did so after the various band members had hugged each other, and 
after a demonstrative group hug that seemed to sum up SOAD’s message last night: “We 
have shit to deal with. But we’ve got this nation and we’ve got this republic. Let’s get to 
work…” 





Diasporan Divergences, Debates and Dilemmas 
The centenary revealed a vast array of stakeholders in the field of genocide commemoration. 
Most obviously, this included the Armenian Republic and the diaspora, the latter comprised 
of distinct communities, each with their own national narratives relating to their home states. 
Whereas much of the focus was on Istanbul and Yerevan, the centenary also showed how 
permanent living in diaspora is for Armenians, while having an enduring sense of connection 
and historical origin. The widespread public emergence of third and fourth generation 
Armenians of different backgrounds, epitomised in the so-called “A List diaspora,”67 
revealed a heterogeneous imagined community unified by the common thread of genocide. 
The centenary also showcased a strong and uncompromising stance on combatting denial of 
the genocide, as well as its internationalisation. A coalition of influential Armenian and non-
Armenian high profile actors, building on the groundwork that has been done by academics, 
activists and artists, were crucial to the shift in the representation of the Armenian genocide 
as a niche subject to one of international relevance and resonance. Indeed some actors like the 
Clooneys and the Kardashians, with their own distinct brand, added an unexpected glamour 
to genocide recognition and commemoration. The unparalleled potential of celebrity meant 
that the centenary received unprecedented amounts of media attention. The extensive activity, 
together with a coherent narrative espoused by respected international leaders meant that the 
genocide was literally making the headlines one hundred years later.
68
 Although it is difficult 
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to ascertain where public opinion now sits, the fact that international media of all political 
leanings covered the centenary with a relatively unified position must suggest a shift –in 
mainstreaming the genocide, in shedding the vestiges of controversy and in raising public 
awareness.  
 
The question remains however as to whether the centenary had substance as well as style. 
What real impact did the heightened “visibility”69 of the genocide, the memories of lost and 
shattered lives, in the public domain have? In terms of material gains, more countries have 
recognised the genocide in the run up to and since the centenary. This undoubtedly validates 
their Armenian constituents and as such can be considered a symbolic success, however 
politically motivated such moves usually are. However there is no real change in Turkey, and 
despite calls for restorative justice and reparations by some diaspora actors, this remains a 
lost cause in material terms. In a context of a country sliding towards authoritarianism, where 
human rights and liberal values are being eroded, the 2015 commemorative programme, even 
in what was a staunchly denialist environment, now feel ironically like the final remnants of 
freedom of speech and expression. 
 
More broadly, the centenary has been a moment for diasporans to pause, to remember, to 
honour memories and histories, but also to question the centrality of the genocide to their 
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collective identity. There is a sense that recognition and restitution by the Turkish state will 
never be a serious prospect, and that diasporans have to make their own trajectories to put to 
rest this tragic past. The options include reaching out to the Armenian state, to most 
diasporans a distant and foreign land, or a renewed agency in owning and exercising layered 
identities. The poignancy and urgency of genocide recognition is waning after the centenary; 
and with that come fears about the future of the diaspora itself: 
“Many Armenians will remember where they were on 24 April 2015 for years to come. It is 
one of those defining moments in our lives – we had hyped up the 100th anniversary so much; 





 and the 103
rd
 anniversaries will come and go, and “pull” of the genocide 
will weaken as a defining characteristic of who we are as Armenians. What will replace it?” 
Diasporan leader, email interview, October 2015 
 
The centenary revealed a multi-layered diaspora with a number of centres and nodes, 
experiences and perspectives. Panossian (2015), in the run up to the centenary, wrote that 
“the strength of the Armenian people lies in its decentralisation” and described the Diaspora 
as “the entity that sustained Armenian culture, learning and identity for centuries” in contrast 
to a “23 year old brave but problematic state.” The western diaspora has always had to 
negotiate its complex relationship with the Armenian state, their “step-homeland” (Kasbarian 
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2016B). The fact that the diaspora’s roots lie in Ottoman (now Turkish) lands means that the 
Republic cannot assume the support of western Armenian communities. Genocide 
recognition and relations with Turkey have in the past been a point of contention between the 
two entities.  
 
The commemorations were an impetus for many diasporans, individually and collectively, to 
reflect upon wider questions about who has the responsibility and authority to represent and 
mediate the collective past and present. Questions of “who speaks” for a transnation are 
perennial - Armenian state leaders, spiritual leaders, and diaspora institutions have sought to 
“speak” on behalf of others, not least the dead. The centenary was a rare occasion when they 
all “spoke” in relative harmony. It was also a watershed moment in critically engaging with 
the genocide’s centrality in shaping the Armenian diaspora going forward. Aslanian (2015) 
has written eloquently about the problems of “too much memory” for Armenians, the 
limitations and struggles it perpetuates. Diasporans, as descendants of genocide survivors, 
know the weight of having to deal with a painful and complicated personal and national 
history, sometimes with ambivalence and resentment. Gourevitch (2014) speaking of the 
Rwandan case has said that “memory can feel like an affliction, and the greater imperative 
has often been to learn how to forget enough for long enough to live in the present.” 70 In 
time perhaps, the centenary might be seen as a turning point for the Armenian diaspora - a 
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fortress of commemoration, underpinned by international validation – but also a celebration 
of survival and resilience, and ultimately, a perhaps a release from the burden of history. 
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 Armenians from all over the world made the pilgrimage to St. Giragos Church on October 
22, 2011, to attend the consecration of the restored church. It was renovated by the Surp 
Giragos Armenian Foundation (diasporan based), with the support of the local Kurdish-
controlled municipality of the Sur district (at the time). This was led by Abdullah Demirtaş, 
the district mayor, from the (majority Kurdish) Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), a 
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January 2007. It is now considered an important (although controversial, and often divisive 
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